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Abstract:
This paper presents the results of a study on socio-economic and demographic factors that 
affect the intensity of right-wing radicals’ activity in the framework of the Russian-based 
social network VKontakte. Right-wing radical ideas expressed within the VKontakte network 
are most actively supported by the population of the regional centres (Moscow, St. Petersburg, 
Krasnodar Krai) and areas around these centres, which are defined as the semi-periphery in 
the core-periphery model. The intensity of the online activity of right-wing radicals is mostly 
influenced by demographic factors, including the average age of the population, the net 
migration rate coefficient; however, it is not affected by the indicators of economic well-
being. The authors hypothesise that support for right-wing radical ideology on social media is 
determined not by the objective characteristics of the social and economic well-being of the 
population, but by subjective emotional factors (irritation, feelings of social injustice).
  
Keywords: social networks, right-wing extremism, Right-Wing Online Activity Index, right-
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Introduction
Radical right-wing ideas have been riding a new wave of popularity for the last decade (Rooduijn, 
2015). This trend is typical for all Western countries, where various types of right-wing populists 
are gaining more and more political weight (Wodak, 2015). The processes observed in Russia can 
also be called a ‘right turn’ due to the fact that since the 2010s, the rhetoric of right-wing populists 
has been actively exploited in the environment of the Russian ruling establishment (Baunov, 
2010). The traditional core topics of the discourse of the Russian ‘old right-wing’ radicals, i.e. 
supporters of imperial nationalism, have become an element of the current official ideology. These 
topics include protection of the so-called ‘traditional values’, support of the Orthodox Church, 
the problem of illegal immigration, etc. In a context of complicated international relations, the 
Russian authorities do not conceal their sympathy for right-wing politicians from European 
countries (Shekhovtsov, 2018).
 
The objective of this study is to determine the relationship between right-wing sentiments of the 
Russian population and certain factors that characterise the objective conditions of the everyday 
life of the population. In other words, we intend to reveal whether support for right-wing radical 
ideas is linked to particular objective circumstances that are associated with the living conditions 
of the people. The factors under study include indicators that enable us to make inferences about 
the social and economic well-being of the population. These indicators are predominantly related 
to the level of socio-economic development of a particular local government unit or constituent 
entity (subject) of the Russian Federation or region. In modern Russia, we observe a considerable 
level of inequality among certain regions in terms of socio-economic development. This is due to 
the large geographical, economic and cultural-historical diversity of the country. 
*       E-mail address of the corresponding author: evgvik1978@mail.ru
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Achieving the stated research objective is a rather complex task due to certain reasons. For 
example, in the case of Russia, it is difficult to quantify the right-wing radical sentiments in the 
society. Quantitative analysis of right-wing radicals is most often associated with the study of 
political parties that are characterised as ‘right-wing’ in the current political system (Knigge, 1998). 
Today in the Russian political system, there are no legal organisations that could be considered 
right-wing radical movements and that would be eligible for participation in elections (in contrast 
to the period 1990–2000). A certain understanding of the level of right-wing radical sentiments 
can be obtained from annual sociological surveys (e.g. surveys conducted by the Levada Centre 
(Pipiya, 2017). Another source of information is the database on acts of violence and vandalism, 
which is managed by the non-profit organisation SOVA Centre for Information and Analysis, which 
is engaged in research on nationalism and racism in Russia. 
For the purpose of our study, we use information obtained from social networks. Compared to 
other data sources, social networks have one important advantage, viz. they make it possible 
to analyse a large number of users. This approach enables us to assess the spread of right-wing 
radical sentiments across the Russian Federation. 
In the course of the study, the following research questions are answered:
1. What are the tools for the adequate estimation of the number of right-wing ideology followers in 
contemporary Russia?
Giving due consideration to the causes and channels of the proliferation of right-wing ideas, 
we presume that the estimation of right-wing ideology followers can be performed through the 
identification and analysis of the communication content of the right on social networks. This 
tool can enable us to obtain a fairly large amount of data that is sufficient to make an inference 
about the distribution of the right across subjects of the Russian Federation. To mitigate possible 
distortions in calculated indicators, which are normally associated with unequal access to the 
internet in various parts of Russia, a Right-Wing Online Activity Index was designed.
2. Are there any objective factors that affect the distribution of right-wing sentiments across subjects 
of the Russian federation? 
It is necessary to understand what effect (namely the degree of effect) do the objective 
characteristics of people’s living conditions (e.g. welfare, migratory processes, etc.) have on the 
popularity of right-wing ideology. For this purpose, we analyse the effect of 22 socio-economic and 
demographic factors on the intensity of the online activity of the right. 
Right-wing radicals in modern Russia
In fact, it is not easy to define right-wing radical ideology because there is no established terminology 
that describes this type of ideology in modern political discourse. In his attempt to determine the 
range of political parties that can be included in this category, Norris (2005) employs about fifteen 
lexical items ranging from ‘far’ or ‘extreme right’ to ‘libertarian’, and this list can be continued. 
Quite often, the fact that a movement is regarded as belonging to radical right-wing extremists is 
determined by circumstances and can be argued (Mudde, 2007). A remarkable example of this is 
the famous right-wing populist Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) that adopted extreme 
nationalistic slogans in the early 1990s. Consequently, the party leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky was 
considered one of the most prominent ‘fascist’ Russian politicians of that time (Shenfield, 2001). 
However, nowadays, this party is integrated into the existing political system, has representatives 
in the highest legislative bodies, and supports the Russian political regime. Therefore, despite the 
fact that LDPR representatives occasionally use right-wing populist slogans (in particular, with 
reference to migrants), they cannot be considered right-wing radicals.
It should also be noted that radical right-wing movements are changing and becoming more diverse. 
With this in mind, a minimum of two generations of right-wing radicals can be distinguished: 
‘old’ (traditional) and ‘new’ (post-industrial) (Ignazi, 1995), whose ideologies and values differ 
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correspondingly. Regarding the spread of radical right-wing ideology, the following two major 
theories are distinguished: grievance theory and opportunity theory (Koopmans, Statham, Giugni 
& Passy, 2005). The first one deals with a connection between the rise of right-wing radicalism and 
objective circumstances in the life of the population (i.e. radicalism resulting from deterioration 
of living conditions (viz. economic decline, unemployment, etc.). The opportunity theory, on the 
other hand, does not link radicalisation to the population’s grievances, but sees the nature of the 
political system, where the elite initiates and controls the activity of right-wing radicals, as the 
cause of this radicalisation.
Most studies are based on diverse versions of the grievance theory and revolve around the effects 
of objective macrostructural factors, including the anomie/social breakdown thesis, the relative 
deprivation thesis, the modernisation losers thesis, and the ethnic competition thesis (Rydgren, 
2007). At the same time, the opportunity theory links the emergence of right-wing radicals to 
populist xenophobia and political discontent. For the purpose of determining a theoretical 
framework, we define right-wing radicalism as a system of beliefs based on the following: (a) the 
indisputable value of traditional institutions and forms of social organisation (viz. government, 
church, and nation), as well as identification of the personal uniqueness of those who belong 
to these institutions; (b) the importance of preserving and defending these institutions against 
threats posed by the modernisation processes of contemporary society (Minkenberg, 2000). 
Studying right-wing radicalism in Russia has a number of features. For example, in academic 
literature, electoral support for radical right-wing movements is often used to estimate the 
intensity of society’s radical sentiments. In modern Russia, there is not a party or a movement 
that openly upholds radical right-wing ideas. This is what distinguishes the current situation 
from that of the 1990s and even the early 2000s. Russia has a thirty-year old history of radical 
right-wing movements, the first of which was the national patriotic front Pamyat (Memory). It 
emerged in the late 1980s and openly exploited nationalistic and anti-Semitic slogans. In the 1990s, 
right-wing radicals played an important part in the social and political life of Russia, e.g. the 
Russian National Unity by Alexander Barkashov (Simonsen, 1996) as well as a number of other 
less sizable movements (Verkhovsky & Pribylovsky, 1996; Sokolov, 1999). They undertook official 
political activity and participated in elections. In the 2000s, radical right-wing movements became 
marginalised rather quickly and disappeared from the legal political arena. In this regard, M. 
Sokolov even writes about the end of Russian radical nationalism (Sokolov, 2009). 
In the early 2000s, a new wave of nationalism emerged and actively developed with such distinctive 
features as aggressive racism and neo-Nazism (Verkhovsky, 2007). This wave significantly differed 
from the ‘imperial’ right-wing movements of the 1990s. The popularity of the skinhead subculture 
increased. However, the new wave began to decline in the early 2010s; the main organisations of 
the new right-wing were defeated and banned (e.g. Slavic Union, Russian National Unity, Russian 
All-National Union, Movement Against Illegal Immigration [DPNI], etc.). Simultaneously, the 
discourse of power increasingly attracted imperial nationalism as an ideological resource (Pain, 
2016; Laine, 2017). In this regard, nationalist forces in Russia experienced a split in the 2010s. One 
part, which had an imperial tenor, began to support actions of the Russian authorities during 
the protest movement of 2011–2013 (Snow Revolution), and then during the events in Crimea and 
Ukraine in 2014. Some of the right-wing radicals supported the actions of the Russian government 
in Ukraine; the other part, on the contrary, was strongly opposed to these actions (Verkhovsky, 2016; 
Rotmistrov & Popova, 2016). These anti-government opposition groups consistently approximated 
the so-called ‘non-systemic opposition’ in the 2010s, until they metamorphosed into national-
democrats (natsdem) (Laruelle, 2012, 2017; Kolstø, 2014; Horvath, 2015). 
The problem of assessing the online activity of right-wing radicals
For a quantitative assessment of the spread of right-wing radicalism, we utilise data on the 
behaviour of individuals on social media. It should also be noted that actions performed on social 
media do not mean that an individual intends to undertake the same actions offline. However, our 
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study of online activity reveals certain trends in sentiments of the society and a hidden capacity for 
grievances, which cannot be assessed by means of government election results in the context of 
strict regulation of the official political domain. On the whole, we support the thesis that current 
offline processes are becoming more and more intense in the online environment (van Dijk, 2006).
 
Over the last decade, researchers have repeatedly addressed the problem of racism, nationalism 
and xenophobia in the context of the Russian Internet. A range of interesting studies related to 
this issue have been published (Etling et al., 2010; Volkov, 2011; Koshkin, 2011; Pain, 2013, 2014; 
Grinko, 2014; Nikiporets-Takigawa & Pain, 2016). However, all these studies have a qualitative 
nature and are aimed at analysing discourse and discursive practices in the communities of right-
wing radicals. 
For the purpose of estimating the right-wing online activity, a Right-Wing Online Activity Index 
has been designed for constituent entities (subjects) of the Russian Federation. In fact, there were 
several attempts to design an aggregate indicator for the assessment of the degree of intensity of 
right-wing extremism. The most well known manifestation of those attempts is the Demand for 
Right-Wing Extremism Index (DEREX), which has been published since 2003 (Demand for Right-Wing 
Extremism Index, 2016). The index is based on the study of social attitudes and values in European 
countries and Israel. It consists of the following four main categories, reflecting commitment to 
right-wing radical values: (a) prejudice and welfare chauvinism; (b) anti-establishment attitudes; 
(c) right-wing value orientation; (d) the degree of distrust, fear, and pessimism. The results of the 
European Social Survey (ESS) are used as data for the calculation of DEREX. 
Another manifestation of attempts to use indices for the study of extremism is the Extremist 
Media Index, proposed by Holbrook (2015). Holbrook employs the index to grade ideological media 
material conveying extremist sentiments. The system of grading, devised for this index comprises 
two phases. First, titles or texts are coded according to a set of definitions that are intended to 
describe notionally ‘moderate’, ‘fringe’, and ‘extreme’ content. Second, the ‘extreme’ titles are 
coded in more detail in order to reveal ways in which violence is endorsed.
We propose a fundamentally different approach to designing an aggregate index. We rely on 
the assumption that participation in an online community communicating the ideas of right-
wing radicals evidentiates the fact of explicit or implicit support of these ideas. Participation in 
a discussion of content posted in such groups, as well as an open demonstration of consent to 
right-wing radical ideas (e.g. reposting content of these groups) is an indicator sufficient for the 
accurate identification of right-wing ideology supporters. 
As regards factors affecting right-wing extremism, the present-day research tradition involves 
distinguishing the following main groups of factors: socio-economic and demographic. The first 
group includes unemployment rate (Van Dyke & Soule, 2002), level of income and education 
(Pedahzur & Canetti-Nisim, 2004), type of employment, and character of labour (Arzheimer & 
Carter, 2006). Besides, this group comprises the degree of electoral support for right-wing parties 
and the crime rate related to right-wing radicals (Falk & Zweimüller, 2005). The demographic 
factors comprise (a) the ethnic composition of the population (viz. the proportion of white and 
coloured ethnic groups); (b) changes in non-white ethnic groups, etc. (Van Dyke & Soule, 2002); (c) 
migration (viz. the number of migrants, public perception of migrants and minorities, the number 
of refugees in the country, etc.) (Knabe, Rätzel & Thomsen, 2013), and (d) the age composition of 
the population (viz. the number of young people, primarily, men) (Falk & Zweimüller, 2005).
Methodology and data processing
Index calculation 
We processed statistical data, collected from the largest Russian social networking site VKontakte. 
The data showed that the number and distribution of right-wing radicals across the territory of the 
23The Socio-Economic and Demographic Factors of Online Activity among Right-Wing Radicals
Russian Federation is very uneven. With this in mind, we examined the correlation of the intensity 
of right-wing sentiments and socio-economic conditions that could influence the growth of the 
sentiments. 
The proposed Regional Right-Wing Online Activity Index can be displayed by means of the following 
equation:
Index = A + S          (1)
where A is activity within right-wing communities (the term ‘activity’ refers to likes, reposts, and 
comments from participants on the wall of the Internet community).
A = C / V  (2)
where C = likes + reposts + comments and V stands for the total number of VKontakte users in a 
subject of the Russian Federation.
For the purpose of estimation of general activity, only the activity of original commenters (i.e. 
people who left one or more likes / reposts / comments) was taken into account. It was monitored 
only in selected right-wing communities. The activity was rated within the range [0... 10]. The 
weighted coefficients were the same for all the forms of activity (viz. reposts, comments, and 
likes) and were equal 1.
S represents a static component that describes the ratio of the number of participants within 
the monitored right-wing communities and the total number of VKontakte users in a particular 
subject of the Russian Federation. For example, for Tula Oblast, the number of participants, who 
are members of the community Natsional’nyy soyuz Rossii (National Union of Russia), was taken 
into account because about 2,200 individuals out of more than 14,300 members of this group 
are residents of one subject, viz., Tula Oblast (about 25% of the participants reported the fact of 
living in that area in their profiles). In other words, this is a predominantly local group. From this 
perspective, in order to avoid data distortion, the members of the community registered as Tula 
Oblast residents were not taken into account for the calculation of the Regional Right-Wing Online 
Activity Index.
S = P / V  (3)
where P is the number of right-wing communities’ members found in a subject of the Russian 
Federation and V stands for the total number of VKontakte users in this subject.
In order to determine the number of VKontakte users in each subject, a geographical analysis of 
users’ profiles was performed. In September of 2016, when the index was calculated, the social 
network VKontakte was constituted of 380 million registered users. One thousand five hundred 
accounts were randomly selected out of every million of users, i.e. 570,000 user profiles were 
analysed. Subsequently, the obtained data were extrapolated to these 380 million accounts. The 
static component was also rated within the range [0. . . 10].
Thus, the Right-Wing Online Activity Index can take values ranging from 0 to 20. The index shows 
the degree of activity within right-wing communities in a given constituent entity (subject) of the 
Russian Federation. A subject-based modification of this index was also calculated for the period 
of August 1, 2016, to August 31, 2016. 
Data for the calculation of the Right-Wing Online Activity Index
After the selection of particular right-wing content, linguistic markers for the corresponding 
sentiments and attitudes were determined. The resulting collection of language means comprised 
words, phrases, abbreviations, and numerical symbols associated with such phenomena as 
ideological orientation and the right radical identity; denigration of national dignity, including 
the use of profanity and negative names for ethnic groups; derision of nationally important 
historical events and characters; calls for acts of violence (murders, beatings, and deportation of 
persons of a particular race, ethnicity, and religion), including calls for a violent overthrow of the 
constitutional order. It should be noted that we analysed only Russian/Slavic ethnonationalism. 
We did not consider other types of local ethnonationalism (e.g. right radicalism, which can exist 
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among ‘non-Russians’, including Slavic nations). 
Further, the identified linguistic markers were used as tags for an automatic search of right-wing 
online communities on the social network VKontakte with the help of the specialised system of 
social media monitoring and analysis InfoWatch Kribrum. The search for right-wing communities 
was conducted from May 15, 2016, to July 15, 2016. VKontakte is the most popular social network in 
Russia. Forty percent of residents regularly communicate via this social network (as of December 
2016). At the same time, among users of the social network, the share of young people aged 18–24 
is 77% and of those aged 25–39 years is 60% (Communication in social networks, 2017). Hence, 
based on the analysis of VKontakte users, it is possible to obtain data on almost the whole of the 
Russian youth. 
The study data included ‘friendly’ links of members of right-wing online communities as well as 
information on the place of residence, gender, and age obtained from personal profiles of members 
of those communities.
A semi-automatic search based on predetermined selection criteria enabled us to reveal the 
following:
- 314 right-wing communities, which post relevant content;
- 53 communities with the number of participants ranging from 532 to 73,514 people), which 
generate right-wing content on a regular basis.
In order to determine the subject of study, a representative sample of three thousand community 
members was used as a criterion. The total number of communities corresponding to the criterion 
and generating right-wing content amounted to 11 (Table 1).
The data on the gender composition of VKontakte right-wing online communities showed a 
significant prevalence of males. Only 21% of the overall number of participants were females. The 
share of women in most communities ranged from 15% to 30%. An analysis of the age range of the 
participants revealed that followers of right-wing online communities were predominantly young 
people (18-29 years old), who constituted a share of 61%.
Socio-economic and demographic factors affecting the intensity of right-wing online activity
The socio-economic and demographic factors having an impact on right-wing online activity were 
studied based on statistical information describing parameters of the socio-economic indicators 
in the regional context (Regiony Rossii, 2016); the size of the ethnic Russian component of the 
population in a particular subject (All-Russian Population Census, 2010); the level of development 
of the quaternary sector of economy in a particular subject of the Russian Federation (the number 
of personal computers per capita, number of applications for inventions filed in a subject) (Federal 
Service for Intellectual Property, 2016) (Table 2). The impact of these factors on the intensity 
of right-wing online activity on the social network VKontakte was estimated with the Pearson 
correlation coefficient. 
The Right-Wing Online Activity Index by constituent entities of the Russian Federation
The distribution of index values revealed a significant discrepancy between ethnic subjects 
(republics, autonomous okrugs, and autonomous oblast) and other subjects (oblasts, krais, and 
cities of federal significance) of the Russian Federation as related to the intensity of right-wing 
online activity. For ethnic subjects, the value of the Right-Wing Online Activity Index is low; 
whereas, for other subjects of Russia, the value of the index is considerably high. Subjects with a 
higher value of the index are concentrated in the European part of Russia (Moscow, St. Petersburg, 
and Southern regional clusters) (Table 3).
The obtained model of the distribution of the right-radical online activity is in accord with the 
‘core-periphery’ model, well known in economic geography (Raagmaa, 2003; Hryniewicz, 2014). 
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This model was developed by Friedmann (1966) in the 1960s, using the example of one country. 
Wallerstein (1974) and other supporters of world systems analysis elaborated this approach later 
with regard to global processes. In general, this model can be described as follows: the specifics of 
industrial society cause a disparity between the core (i.e. the political, economic and technological 
centre) and the periphery (the remaining territory). The periphery is divided into the near-core 
and the far periphery in relation to the core. The centre has an active modernising effect on the 
near-core periphery, but this impact practically does not reach the far periphery. On the global 
scale of analysis, the near-core periphery is designated ‘semi-periphery’. The core-periphery model 
is employed not only to analyse the economic development of regions, countries, and their role 
in the process of division of labour; but also to describe the distribution of political relationships, 
social forms of capital, discourse analysis, etc. (Zarycki, 2007).
In the case of Russia, this approach is being developed by Zubarevich (2013), who distinguishes 
four groups of regions in Russia with regard to socio-economic development and names them 
the ‘four Russias’. The ‘first’ Russia is a land of large metropolitan cities, such as Moscow and 
St. Petersburg. The ‘second’ Russia is a land of medium-sized industrial cities with a population 
varying from 20–30 thousand to 250 thousand. The ‘third Russia’ is a land of towns, villages and 
settlements, populated by up to 20 thousand people. Finally, the ‘fourth’ Russia is composed of 
ethnonational republics of the North Caucasus and southern Siberia. 
The obtained data indicate that the online activity of right-wing radicals is barely registered in 
the ‘fourth’ Russia. It should also be noted that the relatively low online activity is observed in 
ethnonational entities (subjects) of the Russian Federation that are socio-economically developed, 
e.g. the Tatarstan Republic and the Bashkortostan Republic. With this in mind, we considered the 
following two types of subjects:
1. ethnonational subjects (Group A), which include republics, autonomous okrugs and 
autonomous oblasts (a total of 27 subjects). For this group, the mean value of the Right-
Wing Online Activity Index is 4.5.
2. other subjects (Group B), which include krais, oblasts, and cities of federal significance, 
where there is no pronounced ethnonational core (58 subjects). For this group, the mean 
value of the Right-Wing Online Activity Index is 9.1, which is twice as high as in the Group 
A indicator. 
The online activity of right-wing radicals is highest in the subjects that can be referred to as ‘first’ 
Russia and in those subjects of the ‘second’ Russia that are geographically close to the first one. 
For the convenience of analysis, subjects from Group B with a significantly higher (more than 10) 
value of the Right-Wing Online Activity Index (compared to the mean value of the index of the 
group) were grouped with the subjects located nearby into the following two regional clusters: 
1. The Moscow cluster, which is composed of Moscow, Moscow Oblast, Tula Oblast, Kaluga 
Oblast, Smolensk Oblast, Vladimir Oblast, Ryazan Oblast, and Orel Oblast (the mean value 
of the index in this cluster is 12.3);
2. The South cluster, which includes Krasnodar Krai, Stavropol Krai, Rostov Oblast, Voronezh 
Oblast, Belgorod Oblast (the mean value of the index in the cluster is 12.33).
Several other subjects also have a high index but they were not grouped into clusters. These 
subjects are St. Petersburg (12.77) and Leningrad Oblast (11.49), Primorsky Krai (12.05), Penza 
Oblast (10.85), and Magadan Oblast (10.24). 
We revealed a certain pattern in the distribution of the index value within clusters. The core of a 
cluster is normally a subject that leads in terms of socio-economic indicators, and where the value 
of the index is fairly high. Subjects that are located around the core (near-core periphery) and have 
a lower level of socio-economic development compared to the core subject show higher index 
values (in some cases considerably higher). 
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An analysis of factors for the online activity of right-wing radicals
Analysing the factors that determine the level of socio-economic development of subjects 
constituting Group B and significantly correlated with the intensity of the online activity of right-
wing radicals, we revealed two patterns: 1) a direct dependence of the level of socio-economic 
development of subjects and the intensity of the online activity of right-wing radicals on the 
factors that determine the demographic processes in a particular subject of the Russian Federation 
(i.e. the median age of the population and migration growth rate); 2) an inverse dependence of 
the level of socio-economic development of subjects and the intensity of the online activity of 
right-wing radicals on factors determining the social and economic well-being of a subject (i.e. 
unemployment, differentiation and distribution of the monetary income of the population, and 
the total number of crimes) (Table 4). Further, we focused on the consideration of the patterns 
identified for the subjects of Group B, because the intensity of the right-wing radical activity on 
social media is much lower in the ethnonational subjects of Group A. Obviously, other types of 
extremist sentiments associated with local ethnic nationalism, Islamism, separatism, etc., are 
more relevant for this group of subjects. 
The obtained results accurately indicate that the intensity right-wing radicals’ activity on social 
networks is determined by the level of social and economic well-being of a particular subject 
of the Russian Federation. Analysis of data on the median age of the population enabled us to 
estimate the total number of young working-age people in a subject in general, as well as to assess 
the attractiveness of the standards of living in a subject for this group of the population. We found 
that the median age of the population is higher in subjects with a high intensity of radical right-
wing online activity, which means that the proportion of young people in these subjects is smaller. 
The most skilled and ambitious young people leave semi-periphery subjects for centres such as 
Moscow, St. Petersburg, etc. In general, in subjects, where the Right-Wing Online Activity Index is 
high, similar demographic processes are observed, viz. a negative value of the coefficient of natural 
population growth, high demographic burden with a clear skew towards elderly population, and a 
relatively small number of children and young people (Regiony Rossii, 2016). 
The process of migration of young and active people from some subjects is accompanied by another 
process, which is manifested in the direct dependence of the online activity of right-wing radicals 
on the migration growth rate, and the inverse dependence of the online activity of right-wing 
radicals on the unemployment rate (i.e. the lower the unemployment rate is, the higher the online 
activity of right-wing radicals). Hence, it is possible to make an inference that, in the context of 
the overall aging of the population, unemployment remains relatively low in these subjects. It 
is obvious that jobs are held by labour migrants. The shortage of workers is compensated for by 
internal and external migration. Often migrants come from ethnonational republics, where the 
share of young people is traditionally high and jobs are few (e.g. from the post-Soviet republics 
of Transcaucasia and Central Asia). This explanatory model is clearly illustrated by the Moscow 
Cluster. The largest value of the Right-Wing Online Activity Index is registered in the subjects of the 
semi-periphery (Moscow Oblast, Tula Oblast, etc.), directly adjacent to Moscow, which serves as 
the core. The median age in the Moscow Oblast is 40.06, which is higher than the average value of 
the indicator for Russia. At the same time, the migration growth rate per 10,000 people equals 141, 
which is the largest value across the subjects of the Russian Federation; whereas the coefficient of 
natural population growth is close to zero (in 2015, it was 0.1; and earlier it had remained negative 
for many years) (Regiony Rossii, 2016). 
Thus, we identified two migration pathways. One of them is directed from the semi-periphery 
to the centre (core subjects); the other connects the remaining part of Russia and the post-
Soviet states (being the starting point) to the semi-periphery (being the destination). It seems 
that the considered structure of migration flows contributes to an increase in the right-wing 
radical online activity among young and middle-aged people, who are permanent residents of the 
semi-periphery. As a rule, these young and middle-aged people are well educated. The registered 
correlation between the share of the population with higher education and the intensity of the 
online activity of right-wing radicals equals (r =.35). 
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Under conditions of ongoing labour migration, permanent residents, on the one hand, encounter 
a large number of non-residents; and on the other hand, they compare their level of well-being 
with the social and economic conditions of life in the nearby core regions. Consequently, this 
population begins to support right-wing radical ideas. Here, it should be noted that in the 1990s 
a number of semi-peripheral subjects of the Russian Federation belonged to the so-called ‘red 
belt’, i.e. subjects, where the Communist Party of the Russian Federation enjoyed great popularity 
in elections. Our model was confirmed by the analysis of data on foreign workers, which also 
revealed a direct relationship between the number of foreign workers and the intensity of radical 
online right-wing activity; although this relationship is considerably weaker compared to the case 
of migratory growth (viz. for the number of foreigners with a work permit r=.23, for the number of 
foreigners with a licence authorising professional activity r=.29) (Table 4). It should be noted that 
we considered only official statistics on the number of labour migrants. In fact, unofficial labour 
migration flows can be much higher. 
As regards the other identified factors that affect the online activity of right-wing radicals, they 
demonstrated an unexpected inverse relationship between the Right-Wing Online Activity Index 
and the level of crime in a particular subject (including both the total number of crimes and 
especially grave crimes). This means that the safer the overall crime-related situation in a subject is, 
the higher the intensity of the online activity of right-wing radicals. We also saw a marked inverse 
relationship between the indicator ‘differentiation and distribution of income of the population’ 
and the Right-Wing Online Activity Index. Surprisingly, we did not find any substantial dependence 
of the online activity of right-wing radicals on economic factors (e.g. the gross regional product 
per capita, per capita income of the population, etc.), except for the Consumer Price Index; the 
relationship is insignificant but noticeable (r =. 28). Hence, we can suppose that right-wing radical 
sentiments on social media are not affected by the overall economic welfare; however, right-wing 
radical sentiments are sensitive to changes in consumer prices, which characterises the inflation 
rates experienced by the population. 
Addressing the state of the right-wing radical online activity in ethnonational subjects (i.e. Group 
A subjects comprising ethnonational republics, autonomous okrugs, and autonomous oblast), it is 
important to emphasise that the significant demographic factors affecting the right-wing radical 
online activity in these subjects include the share of Russians in the population, the share of urban 
population, the number of people with secondary education, and the median age of the population 
(Table 5). In ethnonational subjects, the determining factors are the share of ethnic Russians, who 
often feel that their rights are more subject to violation compared to the rights of the titular 
nation, and urbanisation, due to the fact that urban residents in these subjects use the internet 
more actively. Interestingly, in these subjects, we also found a direct relationship between the 
median age of the population and right-wing radical sentiments on social media; so the proposed 
above explanatory model is not applicable in this case. However, we believe that in this case some 
statistical distortion occurs due to the fact that in some ethnonational subjects, the median age is 
low, and the value of the index is also low. In general, this dependence does not seem significant. 
It should also be noted that we excluded the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol from the analysis, 
since these subjects should be considered separately due to their controversial status. 
When we compared our results with the results of Western studies of right-wing movements, 
a number of correspondences were identified. For example, the relationship between negative 
attitudes towards migrants and a tendency to vote for right-wing and nationalist parties is proven 
in studies on electoral behaviour in Western Europe (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Italy and Norway) (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006) and in Great Britain (Kappe, 2015). In the case of the 
United States, the relationship between the size of the non-white population and the number of 
patriotic/militia organisations is shown (van Dyke & Soule, 2002). These studies substantiate the 
fact that the number of people of different ethnic and racial groups within the population of a 
particular region has a stimulating effect on the growth of right-wing radical sentiments in both 
online and offline formats. As regards Russia, the proportion of non-Slavic ethnic groups in the 
population has the capacity to stimulate right-wing radical activities.
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Conclusion
In this paper, an attempt was made to assess the objective circumstances and factors that stipulate 
an increase in the sympathy for right-wing radical ideas in Russian society. For this purpose, we 
analysed the activity of users of the social networking site VKontakte. The focus was on members 
of online communities containing right-radical content. In order to enhance the accuracy of 
measuring online activity in these communities, a special aggregated indicator (the Right-Wing 
Online Activity Index) was designed. The obtained results appeared to be fairly surprising. For 
example, the intensity of online activity of right-wing radicals in ‘semi-peripheral’ subjects of the 
Russian Federation, i.e. the periphery in proximity with major economic and political centres, 
is unexpectedly higher than in the large centres of federal significance such as Moscow and St. 
Petersburg. 
In the course of the study, we saw that indicators of social and economic well-being do not have 
a significant effect on the intensity of right-wing-radical online activity, so they are essential for 
the purpose of analysis. On the contrary, the influence of the federal centres (e.g. Moscow, St. 
Petersburg) or regional centres (e.g. Krasnodar Krai, etc.) cannot be ignored. We presume that 
‘emotional irritation’ acts as a driver of the right-wing radicals’ activity on social networks. 
This irritation is often caused by internal and external migrants, who often come from different 
cultural backgrounds and historically lead a different way of life, as well as by the gap between the 
higher standard of living in the nearby centre (core subject) and the lower standard of living in the 
subject (or city) of residence, etc. Compared to life in centres (core subjects), which are currently 
at the stage of post-industrial development, in a semi-periphery area, life is perceived by people as 
unfavourable and ignominious. This also stimulates a feeling of discontent and irritation. However, 
the real situation in these subjects is far from being catastrophic. This circumstance perfectly 
explains the current situation in relation to hate crimes. On the one hand, a trend is observed 
towards a reduction in the number of assaults involving nationalists (Sova.Database, 2017). 
Simultaneously, sentencing on the charges of spreading propaganda of extremism is increasing 
(Sova.Database, 2017; Judicial statistics, 2017). A large share of convictions for publishing extremist 
materials is connected with the internet and the social network VKontakte (Yudina, 2018). Thus, 
the right-wing radical activity is increasingly moving from the streets to social media. At the same 
time, social media - by nature - can enhance extremist sentiments and stimulate the radicalism of 
users (about the echo-chamber effect see Jamieson and Cappella (2010), Sunstein (2007), Boutyline 
and Willer (2016)).
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Annex
Table 1: List of extremist communities
Tags Community Total number of members
(borot’sya|srazhat’sya) & (“s hachami”|”s 
churkami”|”s hachikami”|”s kavkazcami”|”s 
negrami”|”s zhidami”|”s predateli”),


















«hvatit molchat’», «hvatit prisluzhivat’», 
«putinskaya mraz’», «pyataya kolonna», 
«rashizm», «revolyuciya», «kremlevskoe 
koryto», «krovavaya tyur’ma» 
Ostanovim genotsid Rusov 
(Stop the Genocide of 
Russians) 
5,845
Komitet “Natsiya i svoboda”
(Committee Nation and 
Freedom) 
5,181
Natsional’nyy soyuz Rossii 
(Russian National Union) 14,260
Pravaya druzhina 
(The Right Squad) 13,839
Pravaya politika (The Right 
Politics) 3,043
Russkiy Sektor - 
Natsional’naya Sluzhba 
Novostey (Russian Sector - 
National News Service)
7,745
Prizrak rossiyskogo maydana 
















Source: Own calculation based on data search system InfoWatch Kribrum
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Table 2: Factors affecting online extremist activity - model developed by the authors
Type of factors Factors Variables Level of factors
Socio-economic
Income level
Gross regional product (GRP)
National
Consumer price index (CPI)
Average nominal monthly wages
Real income dynamics
Per capita income of the population
Differentiation and distribution of income of 
the population
Unemployment
Unemployment rate (as reported in 
population surveys)
Unemployment rate (as reported by the 
Federal Service for Labour and Employment)
Education level
Share of the population with secondary 
education
Local




and character of 
labour
Level of development of the 
quaternary sector of economy 
in the subject 
Number of applications for 










filed in the 
subject
Crime rate
Total number of crimes
Local





Share of ethnic Russians in the subject
Migration 
processes
Proportion of urban and rural population
Net migration 
rate
Number of foreign citizens 
with a work permit
GlobalNumber of foreign citizens 
with a licence authorising 
professional activity





Median age of the population
LocalMale-female ratio
Number of grave and especially grave crimes
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Table 3: Distribution of values of the Right-Wing Online Activity Index, by constituent entities 
(subjects) of the Russian Federation
Constituent entity (subject) of the Russian 
Federation
Identified members of 
extremist communities 
(in number of people)
Extremist Activity 
Index
Adygea Republic (Adygea) 138 6.46
Altai Republic 53 3.85
Altai Krai 866 6.05
Amur Oblast 210 7.67
Arkhangelsk Oblast 798 6.74
Astrakhan Oblast 582 8.74
Bashkortostan Republic 1,415 3.35
Belgorod Oblast 1,172 10.46
Bryansk Oblast 854 9.67
Buryatia Republic 205 2.70
Vladimir Oblast 903 10.73
Volgograd Oblast 2,175 8.98
Vologda Oblast 1,006 8.78
Voronezh Oblast 1,995 12.53
Dagestan Republic 104 1.15
Jewish Autonomous Oblast 19 3.70
Zabaykalsky Krai 311 6.33
Ivanovo Oblast 642 9.10
Ingushetia Republic 10 0.95
Irkutsk Oblast 1,021 5.75
Kabardino-Balkar Republic 61 2.25
Kaliningrad Oblast 916 7.41
Kalmykia Republic 24 1.02
Kaluga Oblast 826 12.91
Kamchatka Krai 20 5.23
Karachay-Cherkess Republic 43 4.52
Karelia Republic 441 8.47
Kemerovo Oblast 1,955 8.72
Kirov Oblast 854 8.55
Komi Republic 528 11.43
Kostroma Oblast 404 8.16
Krasnodar Krai 5,483 12.71
Krasnoyarsk Krai 2,091 7.02
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Kurgan Oblast 332 6.09
Kursk Oblast 740 9.69
Leningrad Oblast 778 11.49
Lipetsk Oblast 783 9.24
Magadan Oblast 79 10.24
Mari El Republic 263 5.36
Mordovia Republic 499 9.60
Moscow 22,396 10.61
Moscow Oblast 4,312 15.60
Murmansk Oblast 722 6.94
Nenets Autonomous Okrug 22 7.15
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast 2,310 7.73
Novgorod Oblast 173 8.46
Novosibirsk Oblast 1,979 7.09
Omsk Oblast 1,159 7.18
Orenburg Oblast 933 6.45
Oryol Oblast 654 12.52
Penza Oblast 954 10.85
Perm Krai 1,606 6.16
Primorsky Krai 944 12.05
Pskov Oblast 457 8.72
Rostov Oblast 4,212 13.55
Ryazan Oblast 757 10.81
Samara Oblast 2,874 9.18
Saint Petersburg 11,641 12.77
Saratov Oblast 1,484 8.47
Sakha Republic (Yakutia) 185 2.79
Sakhalin Oblast 137 4.56
Sverdlovsk Oblast 2,859 9.57
North Ossetia-Alania Republic 70 2.51
Smolensk Oblast 653 10.82
Stavropol Krai 1,651 12.46
Tambov Oblast 505 7.62
Tatarstan Republic (Tatarstan) 1,341 3.86
Tver Oblast 925 8.55
Tomsk Oblast 567 9.86
Tula Oblast 1,279 14.31
Tuva Republic 35 1.11
Tyumen Oblast 849 5.51
Young People’s Perspectives on How ‘Zhuz’ and ‘Ru’ Clans Affect Them: Evidence from Three Cities in Post-
Soviet Qazaqstan
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Udmurt Republic 598 4.64
Ulyanovsk Oblast 632 6.63
Khabarovsk Krai 736 7.82
Khakassia Republic 194 5.35
Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug (Yugra) 942 6.05
Chelyabinsk Oblast 2,180 7.28
Chechen Republic 95 3.02
Chuvash Republic (Chuvashia) 369 3.48
Chukotka Autonomous Okrug 12 4.36
Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug 305 7.65
Yaroslavl Oblast 1,107 9.19
Republic of Crimea 561 11.06
Sevastopol 216 10.73
Source: Own calculation based on data presented in Table 1
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Table 4: Correlation between factors and the Right-Wing Online Activity Index in constituent 
entities (subjects) of the Russian Federation without an ethnic core (all subjects, except for the 
ethnic subjects)
Factor Correlation coefficient
Gross regional product per capita -0.192698331
Real income dynamics -0.008835861
Per capita income of the population 0.041983825
Average nominal monthly wages -0.081520266
Consumer price index (CPI) 0.276683988
Differentiation and distribution of income of the population -0.464183261
Unemployment(based on population surveys) -0.473085134
Unemployment(as reported by the Federal Service for Labour and 
Employment) -0.378178762
Population with secondary education -0.233078828
Population with higher education 0.353789122
Applications for inventions filed in the subject 0.16642113
Number of households with a computer -0.216644348
Share of ethnic Russians in total number of population 0.275968991
Number of foreigners with a work permit 0.229893344
Number of foreigners with a licence authorising professional 
activity 0.289822961
Net migration rate coefficient 0.517929961
Share of urban population 3.32904E-05
Male-female ratio 0.32731249
Median age of the population 0.487102765
Total number of crimes -0.472380354
Number of grave and especially grave crimes -0.267292038
Note: p < 0.05
Source: Own calculation based on data presented in Table 3 and data from Federal State Statistics 
Service (2016), All-Russian Population Census 2010 (2010) and Federal Service for Intellectual 
Property (2016)
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Table 5: Correlation between factors and the Right-Wing Online Activity Index for ethnic constituent 
entities (subjects) of the Russian Federation
Factor Correlation coefficient
Gross regional product per capita 0.378438558
Real income dynamics -0.300145041
Per capita income of the population 0.375772354
Average nominal monthly wages 0.351354799
Consumer price index (CPI) -0.134375854
Differentiation and distribution of income of the population -0.433158563
Unemployment rate (based on population surveys) -0.511981477
Unemployment rate (as reported by the Federal Service for 
Labour and Employment) -0.35266416
Population with secondary education 0.554626834
Population with higher education 0.127095773
Applications for inventions filed in the subject -0.132607669
Number of households with a computer 0.440864246
Share of ethnic Russians in the total number of the population 0.591147787
Number of foreigners with a work permit 0.289586357
Number of foreigners with a licence authorising professional 
activity 0.178305702
Net migration rate coefficient -0.01387796
Share of urban population 0.560834507
Male-female ratio 0.001231802
Median age of the population 0.492551922
Total number of crimes 0.373972831
Number of grave and especially grave crimes 0.08082078
Note: p < 0.05
Source: Own calculation based on data presented in Table 3 and data from Federal State Statistics 
Service (2016), All-Russian Population Census 2010 (2010) and Federal Service for Intellectual 
Property (2016)
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